Credibility and Class in the Evolution of Public Banks: The Case of Turkey by Marois, Thomas & Güngen, Ali Rıza
Credibility and Class in the Evolution of Public Banks: The Case of Turkey 
Marois, Thomas and Güngen, Ali Rıza 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor and Francis in [Journal 
of Peasant Studies that will be published in the Journal of Peasant Studies 
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fjps20/current   
Downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22002/  
 
Introduction 
 
Forms of public banking go back thousands of years while modern public banks have 
served important developmental functions in most countries‟ transitions to capitalism 
over the last century. By the 1970s estimates suggest that 65 percent of the largest 
banks‟ assets were publicly controlled in developing countries and 40 percent in the 
advanced economies (Levy Yeyati et al. 2007, 212). Today public banks still account for 
a quarter of all banking assets, despite global transitions to neoliberalism and associated 
privatization processes (de Luna-Martinez and Vicente 2012, 2). The aftermath of the 
2008-09 global financial crisis, moreover, has renewed interest in the developmental 
potential of public banks (UN 2015).  
Yet within the problematic of property rights and institutions, the debate around 
bank ownership and development is as starkly polarized as ever. Conventional 
neoclassical economists regard private bank ownership as innately superior whereas 
institutional political economists understand public bank ownership as offering 
conclusive developmental advantages (cf. Caprio et al. 2004; Öztürk et al. 2010; World 
Bank 2012; Mazzucato and Caetano 2015). Research is most often framed around 
establishing that either public or private banks can best achieve developmental gains. 
Substantiating, yet contrasting, evidence is in no short supply for either view, leaving 
development policy and advocacy in somewhat of a lacuna.  
A recent intervention by Peter Ho suggests a way past such static positions, 
characterised by fruitless „institutional chicken or egg‟ debate into whether markets 
determine institutional structures or vice versa (2013, 1087). Ho does so through the 
lens of institutional credibility, which suggests that institutions that exist and persist over 
time are “credible and the spontaneous cause and effect of development” (2013, 1088; 
emphasis in original). In this framework, it may be the case that neither private nor public 
banks are innately superior. It may be that it depends, and deciding on what means 
dissecting the historical complexities of how and why case-specific institutions function 
as they do (cf. Ho 2013, 1096). The approach should help guide us through the 
otherwise unproductive debates asserting either public or private banking superiority.  
 We apply this credibility lens to the case of public banking in Turkey. We do so 
not to assert their developmental superiority but to help us capture the public banks‟ 
evolving and often contradictory functions across different phases of capitalism, most 
recently neoliberalism. We define capitalism, at base, as a historically specific phase of 
development wherein private ownership over the means and over the social products of 
social production is dominant, just as the associated and exploitative capital–labour 
relationships are predominant (Hanieh 2013, 6). Moreover, we see contemporary 
capitalism as neoliberal. Neoliberalism emerged out of the 1970s as a class-based 
ideology that suggests all social, political, economic, and ecological problems can be 
resolved by more direct exposure to private ownership and market competition. While 
entailing market-oriented policy matrixes, neoliberalism has consolidated as a new form 
of social rule, power, and class domination that has, as a key political objective, 
aggressively targeted organized labour‟s capacity to resist market reforms for the benefit 
of capital (Harvey 2005; Marois and Pradella 2015).  
Our contribution to this special issue‟s thematic is two-fold. First, we concretely 
examine the under-explored issue of continued public banking under neoliberalism, 
through the under-studied case of Turkey and its long-held and large public banks. 
Second, we engage debates on bank ownership and institutional credibility from a 
historical materialist framework. We argue that Turkey‟s public banks have evolved 
spontaneously, and often unintentionally so, in ways supportive of capitalist 
development. This support underpins the public banks‟ class-based credibility and, 
hence, persistence, even within neoliberalism. Such credibility is not an essential 
characteristic, but a historically shifting institutional condensation of the public banks‟ 
social content.  
 We develop our argument as follows. Section One explores contending 
neoclassical and historical materialist views of banks through this special issue‟s 
thematic lenses of spontaneity and credibility. Sections Two to Four deal with our case 
study, exploring the evolution of the public banks from Turkey‟s postwar consolidation of 
capitalism, to its post 1980s transition to neoliberalism, and through its response to the 
2008-09 global crisis. This is followed by a brief conclusion. 
 
1.0 Contending Views on Bank Ownership: Spontaneity and Credibility 
 
Our understandings of social history, theory, and evidence are arrived at through 
interpretive lenses. For critical scholars such knowledge is never neutral as facts come 
linked to the values of socially located individuals (cf. Cox 1981; Alcoff 1996), reinforcing 
the need for theoretical engagement. This understanding is contrary to the positivist, 
value neutral stance of much conventional economic thought (Lawson 2013, 957). As 
researcher Stephen Spratt recognizes in the field of finance and development, “The 
answers arrived at may owe as much to the ideological predispositions of their authors 
as to conclusive empirical evidence.” (2009, 1) Hence scholars ought to identify and 
defend their theoretical frameworks in a world of contending approaches as a matter of 
investigative rigour. To this end, we first explore today‟s dominant framework, the 
conventional liberal cum neoclassical private interest view on banks, which we suggest 
is a pre-social a priori approach. We contrast this with an alternative historical materialist 
framework, which we suggest is an historical-structural approach sensitive to the social 
forces affecting changes in the public banks. We organise the discussion around the 
thematic notions of spontaneity and credibility. 
 
1.1 Conventional Private Interest Views on Banking 
The conventional private interest view is the dominant paradigm for interpreting banking 
institutions today, most notably within major international financial institutions (IFIs) like 
the World Bank (Barth et al. 2006; World Bank 2012). As expressed in a benchmark 
study by La Porta et al., private interest frameworks believe that “governments acquire 
control of enterprises and banks in order to provide employment, subsidies, and other 
benefits to supporters, who return the favor in the form of votes, political contributions, 
and bribes” (2002, 266). It follows, in this view, that where public bank ownership 
prevails, economic growth, efficiency, and development suffer. Consequently, private 
banks should supplant public ones. The analytical foundations of this approach draw 
from neoclassical economics and neoliberal thought as related, if different, bodies of 
conventional scholarship. 
We begin to navigate this approach via the concept of spontaneity that, in 
general, refers to the act of something occurring suddenly and without being 
premeditated. In many ways, spontaneity is the sine qua non of conventional 
understandings of a desirable, modern, market society. For our purposes we can look to 
Friedrich Hayek. Building on Adam Smith‟s metaphor of the „invisible hand‟, Hayek 
(1984) defined liberalism as a self-generating, unintended, and spontaneous social order 
that is both neutral and natural. In this view society is the sole product of individual 
human actions, but not of their intentions (Solomon 2010, 129). Individuals‟ actions, 
moreover, are innately motivated by egoistic desires for prosperity. As individuals are 
also rational, they will only enter into exchange relationships (the basis of society) that 
are of mutual benefit. Mutual exchanges should lead to the greatest good: reciprocity, 
rather than any common purpose, is the most desirable social ordering principle. 
Credibility thus theoretically depends on a social order defined by individual exchange 
relations. Furthermore, because governments and their institutions are composed of 
egoistic individuals, the coercive powers of government must be limited to protecting the 
rule of law, mediating market exchange, and facilitating justice. Private property is 
fundamental because it is the sole realm in which individuals can prohibit others from 
infringing upon their choices (Hayek 1984, 368). It follows that market-based 
competition, protected from political distortions, is the most just and credible means of 
wealth distribution. 
While Hayek‟s liberalism depended little on the quantitative modelling of 
conventional economics, neoclassical economic assumptions rely on liberal 
individualism (Solomon 2010, 130-4). Specifically, neoclassical methodological 
individualist and hypothetical deductivist approaches presume the pre-social, self-
interested liberal individual and voluntary (if constrained) exchange (Vanberg 2005, 24; 
34-5). Mathematical deductivism then operationalizes individualist hypotheses along 
positivist lines. Deductivism holds that “all explanation be expressed in terms of „laws‟ or 
„uniformities‟ interpreted as (actual or „hypothetical‟) correlations or event regularities” 
(Lawson 2013, 950). Deductivism anchors neoclassical economics to liberal 
individualism. 
Liberalism further supplies the theoretical basis for important dichotomies in 
conventional economics, such as the separation of politics and economics, state and 
market, and public versus private. The implication being that the sphere of economics, 
the market, and the private sector are from the start the most credible options because 
decisions about buying, selling, pricing, producing, borrowing, and lending are best 
made by individuals. Privatization processes should naturally follow. As Andrei Shleifer 
argues, private ownership constitutes the source of market-based incentives to innovate 
and be efficient, which “politicization” jeopardizes (1998, 136-7; 148). The private 
interest view extends these tenets into banking, arguing that grafting any positive 
attributes onto public bank ownership is both idealistic and naïve (Barth et al. 2006, 34-
5). Credible, socially desirable results are achieved via private actors and market 
discipline free of government ownership (Barth et al 2006, 14). 
This view meaningfully informs contemporary IFI policy formation and research 
on banking and development. In 2001 the World Bank‟s Finance for Growth report 
stated, “[w]hatever its original objectives, state ownership tends to stunt financial sector 
development, thereby contributing to slower growth.” (2001, 123) This claim is followed 
four pages later by a revealing, if awkward, admission that “[u]ntil recently, the primary 
evidence on this issue [government failure in finance] has been anecdotal” (World Bank 
2001, 127) – that is, after some two decades of bank privatization advocacy. The World 
Bank‟s inaugural Global Financial Development Report 2013 (2012, 101) continues: 
 
The empirical evidence largely suggests that government bank ownership is 
associated with lower levels of financial development and slower economic 
growth. Policy makers need to avoid the inefficiencies associated with 
government bank ownership … 
 
In this paradigm, the credibility of public banks is determined a priori, even if one 
performs laudably according to conventional efficiency and profitability criteria. An 
underlying credibility problem inevitably remains that can only be resolved by ownership 
transfer to the private sector. This is because political interventions into the economy are 
understood as innately motivated by self-interested politicians seeking re-election (cf. 
Kane 1977; La Porta et al. 2002). In the final analysis, why any society might promote or 
preserve public banks is a matter of predetermined, pre-social knowledge.  
In many ways, however, the policy face of the private interest view is represented 
by new institutional economics (NIEs), which attempts to practically integrate the role of 
institutions into a spontaneous individualist market order. NIE scholars often forefront 
Hayekian propositions around market-supporting institutions, since these institutions are 
needed to protect the rule of law and private property rights (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2010, 14). In this way, NIE accounts of banking fit well with private interest views. As NIE 
scholar Stephen Haber (2005) argues in the case of Mexico, weakened property rights, 
associated with state interventions like bank nationalizations, lead to underdevelopment, 
market inefficiencies, and populist policymaking. The NIE innovation over and above 
other neoclassical approaches is that politics matter to a country‟s banking system 
(Calomiris and Haber 2014, 4). Still, the necessity of universal private property 
protections and market enhancing institutional frameworks are preserved in their 
definition of „fundamental political institutions‟ (Calomiris and Haber 2014, 12-13; 35).  
 The implications might be read as contradictory. Property rights structures 
around banking are not smoothly derived from the intentions of politicians or from the 
unfolding of market efficiencies but are mediated by deals struck between competing 
coalitions (Calomiris and Haber 2014, 38). A fair proposition. Yet such historical 
mediations and co-evolution apparently do not apply to actually-existing public banks, 
whose characteristics inherently lead to self-interested and corruptible ends (2014, 35-
6). As Calomiris previously argued in the Global Financial Development Report 2013, 
any move towards public banks would increase systemic risk, encourage government 
corruption, and lead to fiscal losses in ways that undermine economic stability (World 
Bank 2012, 117). Consequently, the fundamental institutions deemed as a priori credible, 
such as property rights and markets, are subject to mediating political power relations 
(within limits). Yet institutions deemed as a priori without credibility, such as the public 
ownership (of banks) are suddenly (even selectively) not subject to mediating power 
relations. Here there is no room for spontaneity as public banks are pulled out of 
historical, socio-political determination. Conventional maxims like „bureaucrats make bad 
bankers‟ thus prevail (see World Bank 2001, 123). 
This critique of conventional understandings of spontaneity and credibility of 
public banks has broader theoretical and empirical backing. Theoretically, critical social 
scientists argue that neoclassical economics and NIE cannot adequately defend their a 
priori assumptions around market neutrality; cannot justify their narrow focus on property 
rights; and cannot avoid grafting contemporary social relations (like private property 
relations) onto the whole of human history (Ankarloo 2002; Hodgson 1986; Lawson 
2013). Empirically, too, superior private bank efficiency claims do not always hold: the 
“evidence that the prevalence of state ownership in the banking sector conspires against 
its ultimate development thus appears to be weaker than suggested by previous studies” 
(Levy Yeyati et al. 2007, 237-8). So is it in the case of Turkey where empirical research 
suggests that the public banks are now among the most efficient banks (Aysan and 
Ceyhan 2010; Kök and Ay 2013). The point is not to assert public ownership superiority 
but to insist that greater emphasis is needed on the historical contexts of different 
countries, and the specificity of their private and public banking systems, in ways that do 
not prejudge public bank ownership in and of itself (cf. Körner and Schnabel 2011; Brei 
and Schclarek 2013; Ho 2013; Mazzucato and Caetano 2015). 
 
1.2 An Alternative Historical Materialist View 
An alternative to pre-social views of banking can be found in historical materialism, itself 
a diverse body of scholarship. Yet unlike the private interest view there is no 
contemporary Marxian-inspired research programme around bank ownership and 
development. Rather, research on money and finance has tended to explore systemic 
issues and, most recently, financialization processes (Itoh and Lapavitsas 1999; Duménil 
and Lévy 2011; Lapavitsas 2013). As such, we are attempting to break new theoretical 
ground by sketching out a different understanding of bank ownership, guided by related 
Marxian works in the field (cf. Hilferding 2006 [1981]; Lenin 2011 [1964]; dos Santos 
2009; Marois 2012).  
To manage this dialogue with conventional views, we too engage the concepts of 
spontaneity and credibility. And whereas spontaneity in conventional terms leads to the 
polarization of public and private spheres and to the fetishization of the individual, in 
historical materialist terms spontaneity drives towards a more holistic interpretation of 
change interpreted within the competitive confines of capitalist social relations of 
production and social reproduction. Marx writes in the Grundrisse (1973, 580): 
 
While free competition has dissolved the barriers of earlier relations and modes 
of production, it is necessary to observe first of all that the things which were a 
barrier to it were the inherent limits of earlier modes of production, within which 
they spontaneously developed and moved. These limits became barriers only 
after the forces of production and the relations of intercourse had developed 
sufficiently to enable capital as such to emerge as the dominant principle of 
production. The limits which it tore down were barriers to its motion, its 
development and realization.  
 
In this understanding spontaneous human interactions and economic relations 
are seen as significant to historic change, but not as determinant in themselves (as in 
conventional thought). Marx periodizes change by identifying the specificity of social 
class relations specific to capitalism that, as such, impart a historically-specific social 
logic onto, but does not determine, individual agency in processes of change and 
development (Nachtwey and ten Brink 2008). Ontologically this means perceiving the 
real world as a totality of social relations – a “logic construct that refers to the way the 
whole is present through internal relations in each of its parts” (Ollman 1993, 37). Put 
otherwise, socio-economic phenomena can rarely be captured as straightforward cause 
and effect since, in reality, far more complex processes of mutual interaction are at play 
(Ho 2013, 1090). Likewise in our view of banking: ownership should not be singled out 
as independently causing another process (such as inefficiencies in neoclassical 
thought) but should be considered as evolving within a complex totality and the concrete 
dynamics of different societies. As Hugo Radice writes, the exogenous sources of 
change pointed to by conventional theorists are for Marxian scholars endogenous to 
world capitalism as a whole while simultaneously originating in specific countries (2004, 
189). Change occurs within, is shaped by, and in turn reshapes the historical-structural 
totality of capitalism in spontaneous and often unpredictable ways. 
Such a conceptualization facilitates explanations of contradictory, cumulative, 
and complex social change. In this it too allows analytical room for interpreting the 
unintended consequences of intended actions, without suffering from the voluntarism of 
liberalism or ahistoricity of methodological individualism. Marx‟s contemporary, Friedrich 
Engels, writes (1959, 230): 
 
The ends of actions are intended, but the result which actually follow from these 
actions are not intended, or when they do seem to correspond to the end 
intended they ultimately have consequences quite other than those intended. 
Historical events thus appear on the whole to be likewise governed by chance. 
But where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is governed by 
inner, hidden laws, and it is only a matter of discovering these laws. 
 
The key is the non-deterministic, if structured, notion of „governed‟ historical 
events. Here we can see complementarities with the special issue‟s credibility thesis and 
understanding of spontaneous development. For Ho (2013, 1088) in the case of China, 
institutional structure is not the result of intentional design by which institutions 
can be „wrongly‟ or „rightly‟ engineered. … [which] does not exclude intentional 
action per se, but implies that an actor will not see its intentions materialize as 
these water down into something else through the protracted bargaining with 
other actors and economic agents. The outcome is a complex, multi-layered, 
contradictory and, at times, downright unintended institutional constellation…. 
It needs emphasizing that to ontologically work with a conceptualization of social 
totality is not to jettison historical specificity or individual agency. From our view, this 
means working across different levels of generality, from the most specific to the most 
general, in making a reasoned understanding. Here Marxian theory differs from 
liberalism and methodological individualism, which ontologically jumps from the level of 
the individual to positing the nature of human society, skipping the historical specificity of 
capitalism and class societies (Ollman 1993, 58). Hence private and public ownership 
assumes the very characteristics theoretically grafted on them, regardless of time or 
space. We seek to avoid this error by analytically internalizing spontaneous interaction 
into processes of change and evolution alongside questions of credibility. It follows that 
the actions of individuals and the operations of institutions can neither be read off as 
simply following the logic of capital or as the unmediated result of some class-based 
intentional design. Rather, we see institutions (including banks) as complex 
hybridizations of social and class-based struggles that rarely cohere to any idealized 
notion, including neoliberal ones today (cf. Peck et al. 2012, 271). 
Following on this, we suggest that public banks can be understood as 
“institutionalized social relations that reflect historically specific relations of power and 
reproduction between the banks, other firms, the state, and labor in general” (Marois 
2012, 29). Conceived in this way our research seeks to generate a more historical- and 
context-specific understanding of the social forces, sometimes in unintentional and 
contradictory ways, shaping the public banks in Turkey across different phases of 
capitalist development. Hence, it is not that policy makers and class actors do not have 
„intentional designs‟, but that these intentions are always subject to power relations, 
variegated domestically and in the context of a shifting world market such that any 
concretized institutionalizations of power (in our case, public banks) are never an 
unmediated result (Albo 2005; Peck and Theodore 2007; Peck et al. 2012). 
It follows that the persistence and credibility of Turkey‟s public banks should not 
be theorized as historical anomalies or as perverse distortions of free markets, as per 
conventional approaches. Rather, Turkey‟s evolving public banks institutionally reflect 
contradictory social, economic, and political pressures under different phases of 
capitalism as realised within in a complex and concrete place, and as such become like 
functional modus vivendi defined by these pressures. Turkey‟s public banks, therefore, 
are not immutable institutions determined by ownership form. But they are institutions 
that evolve spontaneously in the conditions of global capitalism as mediated by Turkey, 
the shifting social content of which shaping whether they prevail and are credible at a 
given time, in a given space. 
 
2.0 Public Banking, Capitalist Transition, and Class Formation in Turkey 
 
To anchor our specific discussion of public banking in Turkey, it is worth pausing to note 
the broad functions of credit systems in capitalist transformation and the potential roles 
public banks play. First, contemporary banking and credit systems gained significance 
as capitalism took root in ways functional, if not always smoothly so, to capital 
accumulation processes (Mandel 1968, 210). According to Marx, the credit system was 
initially subordinate to wider capital accumulation but then transformed into “a new and 
terrible weapon in the battle of competition” and an “enormous social mechanism for the 
centralization of capitals” (Marx 1990, 778). In this process, no sum of money need 
remain unproductively employed, as new banking institutions enabled scarce money 
resources to be transformed into investment money capital (Mandel 1968, 222-3). A 
materialist explanation for the emergence of modern capitalist credit systems suggests a 
pyramid-like structure of institutions, markets, and assets that evolved spontaneously 
within capitalist accumulation processes (see Itoh and Lapavitsas 1999; Hilferding 
2006). Building on a foundation of trade credit relations among producers, history points 
to the emergence of individual banks as effective money dealers, economizing on credit 
relations. From there, we see the rise of money markets, central banks, and global 
lenders of last resort like the US Treasury and IMF today, all of which function to 
accelerate and smooth capital accumulation and developmental processes.  
 Second, governing elites often assigned public banks important roles in emerging 
capitalist economies and their national development strategies (see World Bank 2012b; 
Chiu and Lewis 2006; Sikor 2012; Chakrabarti 2012). Classically, developmental 
economists argued that the volatility of private capital markets gave rise to the need for 
public banks in underdeveloped countries as a means to providing more stable and long-
term sources of loanable capital that can be directed to priority economic sectors 
(Gerschenkeron 1962). Over time, public banks developed several additional capacities 
more specific to 21st century developmental challenges (Marois and Güngen 2014; 
Butzbach and von Mettenheim 2014; Mazzucato and Caetano 2015). For example, 
public banks can provide effective counter cyclical lending at times of financial crisis. 
Well-run public banks may offer a source of public revenue and enable cross 
subsidizations geared to developmental goals. In some cases, public banks (including 
cases of bank nationalization) have been viewed as a significant countervailing political 
force against the dominance of powerful foreign and domestic bankers in domestic 
affairs. Public banks may also serve as useful tools of income distribution and social 
inclusion across national spaces, tying a country together economically. Recent 
innovations suggest that the extra-market coordinating capacity of public banks may 
deliver the political room needed to privilege green and gendered strategies of 
development. Finally, public banks may offer a means of democratizing finance. 
Consistent with our historical materialist framework, however, such public banking 
functions remain so only potentially, not inherently. 
The case of Turkey broadly conforms to this model, wherein early 20th Century 
banks served a historically formative role in modern Turkey‟s transition to capitalism. Of 
course, banking in Turkey preceded today‟s Republic, stretching back to Constantinople 
as a center of Medieval Venetian and Genoese finance and later as the heart of 
subordinated Ottoman public finances under the imperial watch of the foreign owned 
Ottoman Bank (de Roover 1971; Jacoby 2004). Under the new Turkish Republic and 
after the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress, however, the banking sector in general and the 
new state-owned, public banks in particular assumed an active place in state and class 
formation processes. Local private banks had remained small scale and were unable to 
respond to larger governmental or developmental credit needs (Kuruç 1987). Public 
banking gained prominence as state authorities created large public, deposit collecting, 
commercial banks with mandated developmental orientations (Öztürk et al. 2010, 161; 
see Table 1). For Turkey‟s new political elite and nascent capitalist classes, supporting 
public banks seemed the most viable way of creating the extra-market coordination 
needed to mobilise scarce domestic resources for capitalist transformation, while 
asserting Turkish sovereignty. This was not a bottom-up process shaped by popular 
classes but instead involved governing elites mobilizing Turkey‟s new public banks in a 
state-led process of forming a nascent working class and market-oriented agricultural 
peasantry (Berberoglu 1980; Karaömerlioğlu 2000; Marois 2012, 45-9; cf. Keyder 1983). 
One of the important banks in this historical process was Ziraat Bank (the 
„Agriculture‟ Bank). Ziraat is the oldest, largest, and most important public banking 
institution that persists in Turkey today. Its creation in 1863, as a credit fund for farmers, 
preceded that of the Republic. Yet under the Republic it assumed the role of not simply 
supporting peasant farming, but of underwriting a portion of Turkey‟s capitalist transition. 
To this end, the new government recapitalized Ziraat in 1924, which by then was 
providing over 70 percent of all bank credits (Yüzgün 1982). By the 1930s Ziraat had 
taken a lead in funding agricultural modernization via loans for machinery and its 
promotion of agricultural cooperatives (Berberoglu 1980, 100-1). On the one hand, this 
drew the agricultural peasantry into more formal capitalist markets and debt relations. 
On the other hand, Ziraat became an extension of the nascent state, reaching across 
Turkey. In this way Ziraat functioned within processes of capitalist transformation to 
maintain an integrative role and nationalist orientation via its non-commercial, non-profit 
maximization mandate to support farmers, which was oft-quoted in the land reform 
debates of the early republic (Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 120-1). 
Other public banks also facilitated working class formation via their financing of 
industrialization (Table 1). In 1933 state authorities established Sümerbank and Etibank 
with special mandates to support industrial production, especially via state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Keser 1993, 77; Akıncı 2000). By 1940 Sümerbank was a key agent 
behind Turkish industrialization (and by extension, behind the formation of a waged 
labour class) through its controlling shareholdings of iron, steel, oil, coke, leather, wool, 
cement, and cotton productive enterprises (Berberoglu 1980, 99). Funding gaps 
nonetheless remained in Turkey‟s transition to capitalism, leading state authorities to 
establish various local „Halk‟ banks („People‟s‟ banks, that later consolidated into 
„Halkbank‟) to service a community of cooperatives, trades, crafts, and shopkeepers 
(today‟s small- and medium-sized enterprises, or SMEs) through formal links to the 
Ministry of Industry. In turn, the growing economy and expanding wage labour force 
(whose wages were becoming a new source of deposit capital for the public banks) gave 
spontaneous rise to public infrastructure demands, which the Belediyeler (Municipalities) 
Bank targeted. Given the size and scope of these public projects, authorities later 
merged Belediyeler into the Iller (Provinces) Bank in 1945, which continues to support 
village, town, and city infrastructure capacity today. At the time, the range of Turkey‟s 
public banks boosted agriculture, trade, industry, and infrastructure as integral elements 
of capitalist transformation in Turkey (Akıncı 2000).  
Then, as today, the credibility of the public banks embodied class-based 
contradictions given their roles in Turkey‟s increasingly capitalist economy. For instance, 
when Ziraat Bank purchased wheat supplies in the 1930s this helped absorb the shock 
of the otherwise collapsing commodity prices on the peasantry; this then smoothed the 
otherwise imminent threat of widespread social destabilization (Özbek 2003). 
Contradictions continued in the postwar period of European reconstruction as Ziraat 
continued financing agricultural mechanization, now aided by the US Marshall Plan. This 
funding sped proletarianization in the countryside and rural to urban migration, which 
opened up new sources of cheap labour for industrialization (Pamuk 2009, 376-8). In 
Sümerbank‟s support for industrialization, it also at times exercised direct downward 
control over wages levels to help ensure SOE profitability (Berberoglu 1980, 111). This 
increased the exploitation of workers but supported local industrialists, who benefited 
from cheaper state-produced primary and intermediary outputs. Yet, in the public banks 
themselves, bank managers were often given greater leeway to provide worker bonuses 
and greater workplace benefits (Akıncı 2000).  
The Turkish public banks thus evolved in ways functional to capitalist 
industrialization, with credibility entailing class-based divisions. As seen elsewhere in 
this special issue, the developmental history of the Turkish public banks may share 
significant commonalities with the public banks in China‟s capitalist transformation (see 
Yeung this issue). 
 
Table 1: Public Commercial Banks in the Early Turkish Republic 
Public Bank Year 
Established 
Mandated Development Mission or Target 
Funding 
Ziraat Bank 1863/1888 Agriculture 
Emlak Bank 1927 Home mortgages and real estate loans 
Sümerbank 1933 Other SOEs and industrialization 
Belediyeler 
Bank 
1933 Municipal infrastructural projects like water, 
electricity, drainage and the preparation of building 
plans 
Etibank 1935 Electrical power generation capacity and the 
financing of mining and mineral marketing 
Denizbank 1937 Maritime development 
Halkbank 1938 Cooperatives, artisans, trades persons, and small 
scale producers 
Sources: BAT 1999; BAT 2009. 
 
State authorities later experimented with a phase of postwar liberalizations, 
including a more systematic approach to private banking, spearheaded by the more 
market-oriented Democratic Party after 1950. The market experiment, however, was 
short-lived given Turkey‟s peripheral economic status, and the public banks became 
decisive in Turkey‟s state-led development plans after 1960 (Akıncı 2000; Önder 
and Özyıldırım 2013). By 1970 eleven public commercial banks and three development 
banks controlled just over 70 percent of the sector‟s assets providing credits well in 
excess of those offered by the private domestic and foreign banks combined (BAT 1999, 
24; BAT 2009). The public banks worked in intra-state collaboration with Turkey‟s State 
Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı), established in 1961, to coordinate 
investment, decide on subsidised credits, back new industrial investments and SOEs, 
and allocate foreign exchange as part of Turkey‟s coordinated Five Year Development 
Plans (Aydın 2005, 34-5). It was also in this period, and with the passing of the 1961 
Constitution, that workers, popular classes, and the peasantry became more organised, 
demanding greater rights, wages, and protections. In the banks, worker numbers topped 
130 000 and, as new labor unions formed, they began struggling for better working 
conditions, hours, salaries, vacations, and fringe and health benefits (Marois 2012, 57). 
 
3.0  The Neoliberal Transformation of Public Banks in Turkey 
 
Turkey‟s particular transition to neoliberalism has been explored in depth in the literature 
and need not be revisited in general here (Aydın 2005; Yalman 2009). In brief, however, 
its state-led accumulation strategy entered a period of crisis and reform, triggered by the 
foreign exchange crisis of 1977 to 1980 and the 1980s debt crisis (Metin-Ozcan et al. 
2002, 84). The IFI-crafted January 1980 structural adjustment program, implemented by 
force via the 1980 military coup, signalled Turkey‟s authoritarian transition to 
neoliberalism by opening a new, if short-lived, export-oriented boom premised on the 
suppression of workers‟ rights and labour costs (Metin-Ozcan et al. 2002, 84). Many of 
the labour rights gained were violently scaled back. Turkish capital recognized that 
liberalization measures would help them to restore waning levels of profitability and 
regain lost class power via world market integration (Ercan and Oguz 2007). Yet in 
Turkey, as in all neoliberal transformations, the adjustment process is never smooth, 
always variegated, and mediated by the specificities of its society (Brenner et al. 2010; 
Munoz Martinez and Marois 2014).  
So is it with neoliberal transformations in banking in many developing countries, 
in particular with the shifting legitimacy of public banks (cf. Barth et al. 2006; Levy Yeyati 
at al. 2007; Dos Santos 2009; Butzbach and von Mettenheim 2014). The probable risks 
of rapid bank privatizations to economic stability at the time meant governing authorities 
often did not immediately champion structural bank ownership changes, unlike with other 
SOE sell-offs. Indeed, not until the turn of the 21st century did major bank privatizations 
take off in many developing countries (World Bank 2012, 104). In Turkey‟s case an initial 
attempt at rapid financial opening triggered the costly 1982 Kastelli financial crisis1, 
which gave abrupt pause to authorities‟ enthusiasm for financial transformation (Marois 
2012, 106). Consequently, state authorities did not aggressively pursue large-scale bank 
privatizations, though smaller public banks and the state‟s shareholdings in private 
banks were sold off (Önis 2011; Marois 2012). For much of the 1990s the public banks 
still accounted for over 40 percent of banking assets (BAT 2009, 177). Nevertheless, the 
neoliberal shift in accumulation strategies in Turkey from state-led to market-oriented 
eroded the postwar developmentalist credibility of the public banks. Turkey‟s volatile 
transition to neoliberalism would also drive spontaneous changes in their operations, 
giving rise to new contradictions that would ultimately contribute to the 2001 crisis and 
drive banking changes. 
 A key dynamic of Turkey‟s neoliberal transition thus emerged in the late 1980s as 
export- and wage repression-led growth gains began to peter out. In response and to 
facilitate continued neoliberal transformation, state authorities institutionalized capital 
account liberalization in 1989, thus deepening Turkey‟s world market integration. The 
opening of Turkey‟s borders to flows of foreign capital did not enable virtuous cycles of 
investment, efficiency gains, and domestic growth, as envisioned by neoclassical 
economists (see Balassa 1982). Rather, short-term foreign capital inflows and mini 
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 Also known as the bankers‟ crisis, this crisis signalled the end of a profitability field day for many 
small financiers in Turkey who raised funds from local savers by promising abnormally high 
returns. The banker Kastelli was the most infamous of these Ponzi-type financiers, and hence 
bears the name of the 1982 crisis.  
boom-bust cycles came to characterize Turkey‟s increasingly debt-led accumulation 
trajectory (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan 2000). A significant contradiction arose: 
economic volatility undermined Turkey‟s international creditworthiness and domestic 
stability but neoliberal transition increased the need for public credit due to shrinking 
public revenues. 
Turkey‟s governing authorities saw an opportunity to use the public banks not for 
any developmental or socially progressive ends but to help overcome Turkey‟s fiscal 
troubles. The perceived opportunity involved the public banks‟ „duty loss‟ mechanism. 
Duty losses are mandated financial losses (due to special loan and preferential credit 
provisionings) officially assigned to the public banks that should be compensated for by 
government transfers. In the postwar period duty losses were an institutionalized means 
by which state authorities could channel preferential credits and supports into specific 
economic sectors and regions of Turkey (Marois 2012, 58; 116). For decades authorities 
had used duty losses in fiscally sustainable ways to support postwar capitalist 
development (cf. Öztürk et al. 2010, 161-2; Önder and Özyıldırım 2013). Amidst the 
escalating economic volatility of post 1989 capital account liberalization, governing elites 
realized that they could hide government spending in the public banks‟ books (BRSA 
2003, 10; OECD 1999, 57). According to Central Bank researchers (Özatay and Sak 
2003, 16): 
 
the increasing financing needs of the Treasury led the government to finance 
some activities through loans taken from state banks. Instead of repaying the 
principal and the interest accrued, the Treasury allowed these nonperforming 
loans to be treated as performing loans by the state banks. 
 
The historically-mandated developmental duty loss mechanism was thus turned 
on its head to help smooth Turkey‟s volatile economic transition to neoliberalism 
(Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler 2001, 21; Ergüneş 2008). While manageable in the short-
term, the long-term consequences were unexpectedly grave. The unpaid duty losses 
had swelled from 2.2 percent of GNP in 1995 to 13 percent in 1999 (or from $2.77 to 
$19.2 billion) (World Bank 2000, 96). By 1997, and as the East Asian financial crisis 
kicked in, authorities had to begin scaling back duty loss transfers because of the 
accumulating financial risks they carried (Graph 1). The public banks‟ balance sheet, 
which had to be refinanced through short-term, and therefore more risky, financial 
liabilities, had become bloated with seemingly unrecoverable public sector debts (Özatay 
and Sak 2003, 16; 21). But this retreat of neoliberal support hit key constituencies most 
vulnerable to neoliberal transformation, such as farmers, SMEs, cooperatives, and 
tradespersons. Whereas the ratio of special loans to total loans hovered around 23 to 25 
percent in the mid-1990s, this fell by about 10 percent in 1997-98. State authorities had 
meant to buttress neoliberal transition but unintentionally generated a situation of 
political and economic crisis of neoliberalism – the 2001 financial crisis.  
 
Graph 1: Ratios of special loans in banking sector (1992 to 1999) 
 
Source: BAT, Bankalarımız (1992-1999)  
 
The financial rescue that followed in 2001 became a case of state authorities 
stepping in to save neoliberalism from itself (Marois 2012,165). On the one hand, the 
long term causes of the 2001 financial crisis link back to Turkey‟s post-1980s neoliberal 
turn (Savran 2002, 1). On the other hand, the immediate trigger reflected mounting 
fragilities in the financial sector and the IMF monitored 1999 disinflation programme, 
which pegged the TL to the USD and pre-announced the adjustments (see Akyüz and 
Boratav 2003, Yeldan 2006). While intended to bolster the credibility of monetary policy 
in Turkey, the 1999 programme unintentionally, again, unleashed a new incentive to 
borrow short term in USD and then invest in long-term TL securities. The IMF program 
paved the way for a sharp decline in foreign exchange asset/liability ratios in Turkey‟s 
commercial banks by 2000: the banks‟ open forex positions had exploded from about 
$3.5 billion in 1997 to over $12.5 billion in 1999 (Marois 2012, 120). Investing more in 
long-term government securities with short-term liabilities exposed banks to interest rate 
margin and the liquidity risks in the government debt market. Providing relief to the state 
budget in the medium term, the decline of interest rates and promoting capital inflows 
were the major targets of the three year disinflation programme, which had its first blow 
in November 2000 with a liquidity crisis (Alper 2001). An additional IMF loan of $10.5 
billion enabled the coalition government to stick with the 1999 Programme, only to face 
an even more severe shock in February 2001, with a recurrent rush to foreign exchange 
and skyrocketing interest rates in the interbank money market.  
Rather than reversing Turkey‟s neoliberal course, the 2001 state-led rescue and 
recovery further institutionalized the power of financial capital and the social logic of 
neoliberalism within the Turkish state (Marois 2011, 180). At the helm was the new, 
unelected Minister of the Economy, Kemal Derviş, who hurriedly crafted and 
implemented the market-oriented 2001 Transition to a Strong Economy platform. 
Banking change came under the associated umbrella of the 2001 Banking Sector 
Restructuring Program (BSRP). Primarily, the BSRP legalized drawing the costs of bank 
rescue into the state (that is, socializing them) and named the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA) as the agency charged with undertaking the recovery 
process. State authorities forced some $47 billion worth of funds ($44 billion in public, 
$2.7 in private funds) into the imploding banking sector, totalling about 30 percent of 
GDP (BRSA 2003, 6). In line with new international norms, state authorities 
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institutionalized central bank independence and increased the autonomy of other 
financial regulators. The BSRP and the ensuing reforms also eliminated some capital 
groups from the banking sector and aimed at strengthening the remaining ones within 
the restructuring process of holding groups (Gültekin-Karakaş 2009). In terms of the 
public banks, the 2001 BSRP led to their immediate restructuring and to long-term 
market-oriented operational changes (see BRSA 2002). Authorities did not push 
immediate bank privatization because Vakıfbank, Halkbank and Ziraat controlled about a 
third of all banking assets and any rapid, wholesale sell-off would be fraught with 
political, economic, and social complications. The intention was to privatize the banks 
within a few years, but this too would not occur as planned. State authorities did, 
however, restructure the public banks so that they began to operate as-if they were 
private banks by internalizing new profit imperatives and by becoming subject to private 
sector regulatory frameworks (Önder and Özyıldırım 2013, 14-15). 
The post-2001 neoliberalization of Turkey‟s public banks was a contested 
process. Bank workers, labour unions, peasants, and social progressives led marches, 
protests, and even occupations against what they perceived as a corrupt political bailout 
of private sector cronies and against the market-oriented changes to the state banks, 
which would impact popular access to financial services. But without ruling government 
support and without sustained multi-sector resistance and effective cross union 
collaboration, the 2001 BSRP proceeded and financial imperatives became more deeply 
rooted in Turkish society. 
Yet it is also true that not until late 2005 was the now politically dominant Justice 
and Development Party (AKP; Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) government able to 
experiment with privatizing the restructured public banks. In the period before the 2008-
09 global crisis, this trial involved the least controversial public bank, Vakıfbank, and an 
IPO for 25.18 per cent of its shares (which sold for $1.27 billion). This IPO was arguably 
to test the political process and to build popular consent for the process. A second IPO 
occurred in May 2007: a 24.98 percent stake in Halkbank sold for $1.9 billion. The IPOs 
served to internalise neoliberal profit imperatives through private share-ownership. It is 
significant that during the phase of AKP rule most politically and economically ripe for 
privatization only two public bank IPOs occurred (cf. Önis 2011). Instead, the AKP 
repeatedly extended the legal time limits on bank privatization, notably in July 2004, 
December 2005, and January 2007 (then more recently in November 2010 to extend the 
allowable period until late 2015, with no imminent changes seen by early 2016).  
Further research is required on why this is so. However, in brief, five factors can 
help explain the relatively slow pace of bank privatization in Turkey. First, it took time for 
the public banks to recover from the 2001 crisis and to establish a more marketable 
operational structure for privatization. According to one Halk Bank senior manager, 
potential buyers want the banks‟ private clientele profiles (as opposed to just dealing in 
duty losses and government debt), and public banks without such loans and customers 
simply cannot be sold off to the private sector (confidential Interview, 24 August 2007, 
Istanbul). Second, there remains ongoing and unresolved intra-state debate on the 
functional roles of the state banks. Important governing ministers of the last decade, 
such as Ali Babacan, remained supportive of complete privatization. However, the state 
banks continue to serve mandated payment, deposit, and credit services at a national 
scale, which may not easily be replicated and maintained by private banks. As such, 
some financial regulatory authorities take a more pragmatic approach to privatization, 
suggesting that the process will not or should not be completed in the near future.2 Third, 
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 In confidential interviews with Central Bank authorities, state bank managers, and BRSA 
authorities in 2007 and 2013, the unique role of Ziraat Bank in rural communities, in farming 
the technical aspects of bank privatization were not easily resolved. The large size of the 
public banks militates against one-off block sales as the purchaser needs to be larger 
than the public banks (leaving only a few private domestic contenders, as the other 
public banks cannot bid) and foreign banks may be required to already have a presence 
in Turkey prior to bidding (as with earlier debates over whether to sell Halkbank as a 
block sale or via IPO). There are also questions for the competition authority, as any 
buyer of a public bank would become an immediate market marker. In practice, then, 
initial public offers (IPOs) have prevailed, but even here the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
(now Bourse Istanbul) needed to be better prepared for such large IPOs, and this has 
taken time. Fourth, the public banks are becoming instrumental for emerging AKP plans 
to expand Islamic financial alternatives (dubbed „participation‟ banks) in Turkey since the 
global financial crisis. For example, the AKP founded the first publicly owned 
participation bank as a subsidiary of Ziraat in 2015. Vakifbank and Halkbank are 
expected to follow suit in 2016. Fifth, empirical evidence also suggests that the public 
banks in Turkey may issue loans for political reasons, notably during election cycles, 
while at the same time playing an important role in mitigating economic shocks, as 
explored below (Önder and Özyıldırım 2010 & 2013). In short, there are complex, and 
sometimes conflicting, political and economic logics behind the continued public banking 
presence in Turkey. 
As such the public banks in Turkey spontaneously evolved within the confines of 
Turkey‟s transition to neoliberalism in ways intended to aid the transition but also in ways 
that ended up challenging neoliberalism. The balance of social forces remains 
neoliberal, yet this has not simply equated to bank privatization. Instead, the public 
banks have evolved into profit-oriented institutions while nonetheless maintaining 
vestiges of their developmentalist past. The 2008-09 would once again test the 
contradiction of their class-based credibility. 
 
4.0 The 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis and Rise of Public Banking 
 
The US sub-prime crisis that exploded in 2008 triggered one of the “great slowdowns in 
the history of the capitalist economy” (McNally 2015, 260). As one of many 
consequences, the crisis raised the economic profile of public banks (Mazzucato and 
Caetano 2015). The Addis Ababa UN Financing for Development Report cites, for 
example, the key role public banks can play in financing sustainable development, 
calling on international actors to better support these banks (UN 2015, 13-14). In Turkey 
the 2008-09 crisis has also revealed potentially new credibilities for Turkey‟s public 
banks, and a vexing contradiction for advocates of neoliberal development. Could 
Turkey‟s public banks be constitutive of neoliberal reproduction? We suggest „yes‟. 
Specifically, the 2008-09 crisis revealed that Turkey‟s public banks can (a) offer powerful 
countercyclical lending capacities amidst crisis and (b) do so without sacrificing profit 
imperatives. In this way the public banks helped to stabilize neoliberalism in crisis, while 
helping to mitigate crisis-induced economic impacts on important constituencies (like 
farmers and SMEs), while continuing to churn out record profits.  
 
4.1  The Public Banks’ Counter-cyclical Lending amidst Crisis 
With the crisis unfolding globally in 2008-09, foreign investors led a so-called „flight to 
safety‟ as globally mobile capital fled emerging capitalisms for the security of the US 
dollar (Akyüz 2014). In Turkey, too, markets suffered a massive reversal in capital flows, 
                                                                                                                                                 
regions, and in nation-wide payment services was repeatedly emphasised. We were not granted 
interviews on this topic with AKP officials. 
which collapsed from inflows of more than $60 billion in mid-2008 to outflows of almost 
$10 billion by the third quarter of 2009 (CBRT 2010, 9). The country‟s GDP growth 
plummeted from five percent in 2007 to 0.7 percent in 2008 and then to -4.8 percent in 
2009 (IMF 2012, 47). Industrial output capacity utilization shrank from about 80 percent 
pre-crisis to just over 60 percent by early 2009 (CBRT 2011, 10). Unemployment climbed 
from 10 percent in 2007 to 14 percent in 2009 (IMF 2012, 56). Recent analyses of the 
global crisis confirm what many scholars had already known. Private banks, especially 
foreign, are pro-cyclical lenders – that is, they expand credits in the good times and 
slash them in the bad, exacerbating the peaks of both business cycles (World Bank 
2012, 12; Bertay et al. 2015). Post crisis research also confirms that public banks can 
effectively operate counter-cyclically (Brei and Schclarek 2013). Turkey was no 
exception to this pattern.  
In Turkey, as crisis struck, international analyses have pointed out that the 
private banks, domestic and foreign, began to cut back on new lending and to shift 
money resources into government debt in order to decrease lending risks amidst the 
crisis; by contrast, the public banks increased lending (Mihaljek 2010; IMF 2012, 24). 
Graph 2 illustrates this. Between 2008 and 2010, private domestic banks reduced 
lending from 54.5 percent to 51.6 percent of total loans and the foreign banks from 17.6 
to 16 percent. By contrast, the public banks expanded lending from 23.8 to 28.8 percent 
of total loans. Notably during 2009 the public banks increased loans by 19 percent over 
2008 whereas the private commercial banks decreased loans by 1.75 percent (BAT 
2010). A recent empirical study of Turkey from 1992 to 2010 confirms the developmental 
benefits, concluding that public bank lending at times of crisis has had “a significant and 
positive effect on local growth in all provinces” (Önder and Özyıldırım 2013, 14). 
 
 
Graph 2: Loans by Banks, 2007 to 2014 (%)  
 
Source: BAT 2015b 
 
Empirical evidence reveals that the public banks lent counter-cyclically, but why 
they did so is less straightforward. One reason is tied to ownership. As long-held public 
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institutions, the banks had historical mandates and contemporary capacity to support the 
Turkish economy. In the case of Ziraat, the General Manager wrote that its increased 
lending during the crisis was an issue of “social responsibility” (Ziraat 2010, 13-14). At 
the same time, public control suggests a sovereign guarantee, which enables public 
bank managers to lend more easily than private sector managers beholden to profit 
imperatives. For example, in a confidential interview, one Halkbank branch manager 
referred to the bank‟s history of “non-profit oriented” (pre-2001) support for artisans, 
cooperatives, SMEs, and tradespersons that can still influence today‟s decisions (June 
2013, Samsun, Turkey). The manager also pointed to the direction given by then 
Halkbank General Manager, Hüseyin Aydın, to “not put away the umbrella when it rains” 
(that is, to continue lending) much as with Ziraat. The manager went on to emphasize 
that this was also the “mentality of the branch managers – to support the people – and 
an ethical code of the institution that comes from its background”. Despite the 2001 
BSRP reforms, there remain cultural and developmentalist remnants of past lending 
practices. Neoliberal profit imperatives can be mediated by institutional legacies and 
local banking agents.  
Another reason why public bank lending increased has to do with the 
particularities of capitalist development in Turkey. For example, SMEs (Halkbank‟s core 
client base) amount to 99.9 percent of all enterprises, and SMEs employed 77 percent of 
the active workforce in 2009 (TÜİK, News Bulletin 2012, no 13146). As the already 
largest player in SME loans, Halkbank recorded a 19.6 percent increase in the volume of 
SME loans in 2009 and 26.3 percent increase in 2010 (Halkbank 2010). Halkbank 
benefited from its established contracts in the Organized Industrial Zones and worked 
with development agencies as well as Turkey‟s Small and Medium Enterprises 
Development Organization (KOSGEB) to expand its share in this market amidst crisis 
(Halkbank 2010). Given that unemployment hit 14 percent in 2009, there is a political 
economic logic to a public institution like Halkbank not calling in SME loans as this would 
exacerbate the pro-cyclical turn of the private banks and the crisis‟ impact on the 
economy. In fact, Halkbank had already restarted its provisioning of cheap loans to 
trades and craftspersons in 2004. The government determined the payments due to 
Halkbank based on the interest rate differentials – up to 50 percent of interest payments 
can be set as the bank‟s loss. This mechanism largely determined Halkbank‟s income 
loss payments in the post-2001 period (Table 2). By 2014, more than 300 000 trades and 
craftspersons have benefited from the scheme (Halkbank 2014). Halkbank has thus 
emerged out of the 2001 crisis as a vital source of financial services and special loans 
for SMEs. With no imminent threat to economic stability or the banks‟ profitability (see 
Table 3 below), this is precisely why public banks can be effective agents of economic 
stability. In different and unequal ways, industry, workers, and government benefited. 
Ziraat, too, play an active role supporting Turkey‟s agricultural producers 
(constituting about 25 percent of Turkey‟s workforce) against the impact of global crisis. 
One the one hand, this involved subsidized counter-cyclical lending (that is, special 
agricultural credits discounted by 25 to 100 percent of market rates). Ziraat‟s 2009 
Annual Report states the bank offered nearly two thirds of all new lending (about TL5 
billion) as the crisis peaked between September 2008 and June 2009 (Ziraat 2010). On 
the other hand, Ziraat engaged in another form of countercyclical-like lending by not 
immediately foreclosing on distressed loans.3 According to Ziraat, the bank aided Turkish 
farmers weather the 2008-09 crisis by postponing the payments of TL3.1 billion in loans 
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 An instructive contrast can be found in the actions of some private banks in Turkey that 
repossessed major tracks of lands for speculative accumulation purposes, at times dispossessing 
entire villages (see the following news reports, Karabağlı 2012; Antalya Güncel 2011). 
for 224 000 small-scale producers through its “easy repayment package” (Ziraat 2011). 
This strategy has a developmental logic. A recent empirical study suggests that despite a 
high pace of rural to urban migration, an ageing of village population, and a plummeting 
proportion of farmers in the workforce, there remain resilient agriculturally based 
communities in Anatolia, which benefit from official income transfers, remittances, and 
pensions (Öztürk et al. 2014). Ziraat support contributes to the survival of family-owned 
smallholdings, much as Halkbank supports the viability of SMEs. The public banks can 
function as nation-wide institutional conduits of government policy, and do so within an 
otherwise neoliberal strategy of development.  
Presently, Halkbank and Ziraat can discount their credits without undermining 
their annual returns. Whereas duty losses did not have to be pre-paid prior to 2001, now 
the government must make advance „income loss‟ payments in compensation (PER 
2008, 15). Table 2 shows the Turkish Treasury‟s income loss payments to Ziraat and 
Halkbank since 2002 (Vakıfbank does not participate). While there has been consistent 
growth in payments made, there was a notable jump in 2009 from 2008 for both Ziraat 
(from TL272 to 416 million) and Halkbank (from TL204 to 309 million) as state authorities 
sought to mitigate the impact of the crisis on farmers and SMEs. Later data shows bank 
income loss payments combined with Agricultural Credit Cooperatives, which amounted 
transfers of TL900 million TL in 2011, TL1.66 billion in 2012, and TL1.93 billion TL in 
2013 (PER 2014). These official transfers reflect the cost of interest rate subsidization, 
which the actual loan amounts provided exceed. It is also worth signalling that without 
the pre-existing institutional structures and national geographical reach of Ziraat and 
Halkbank being in place, the effective unrolling of these economic supports would be 
unlikely. 
 
 
Table 2: Income Loss Payments to Ziraat and Halkbank, 2002 to 2011 (million TL) 
 Ziraat Halkbank 
2002 - 16.3 
2003 - 38.0 
2004 1.0 79.4 
2005 24.9 76.8 
2006 109.2 111.0 
2007 168.9 175.8 
2008 272.4 204.4 
2009 415.8 308.9 
2010 354.9 202.4 
2011 564.8 248.9 
Total 1911.9 1462.1 
Source: Public Enterprises Report (2012), Undersecretariat of Treasury 
  
Regardless of neoliberal deepening since 2001, the public banks have thus 
evolved in neoliberalism in credible ways, notably in their capacity to counter the impact 
of crises politically and economically – while remaining profitable. 
 
4.2 The Profitability of Turkey’s Public Banks in Neoliberalism 
The post-2001 restructuring of the public banks was intended to make them marketable 
for privatization. Subsequent successful IPOs suggest this end was achieved. However, 
this same process has had the unintended consequence of making the banks a long-
term and significant source of annual public revenue for the state. The public banks are 
more „saleable‟ but also more precious – insofar as their revenues contribute to Turkey‟s 
much-valued fiscal surplus, which is a key component of current creditworthiness 
assessments (IMF 2014, 41). This contradicts the neoliberal logic for bank privatization, 
which depends on a timeless notion of public sector inefficiency. 
Since 2002 the public banks have recorded solid levels of profit, often 
outperforming the private banks (Table 3). In 2009, notably, the public banks 
outperformed the private domestic banks, recording a return on assets (ROA) of 2.6 
percent. This ROA is about two and a half times more than what banks often make in the 
advanced capitalisms like the UK and US (at about 1 percent ROA) (see OECD 2010). 
The private banks, too, were highly profitable yet opted to cut lending amidst the crisis. 
While lending counter-cyclically, Turkey‟s public banks generated $4.3 billion in 
additional public revenue in 2009 (BAT 2010, I-45).  
 
Table 3: Performance of Commercial Banks in Turkey - Return on Assets (Selected 
years) 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
ROA (%) 
1.6 2.5 2.6 1.9 2.6 2.3 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 
Private commercial 
banks ROA (%) 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.0 
Source: BAT 2015a; BRSA 2015 (* as of September 2015)  
 
There are knock-on fiscal effects. In contrast to the private banks, Ziraat‟s returns 
are neither repatriated to a foreign banks‟ home office nor redirected to a domestic 
banks‟ larger holding group. At the same time, the public banks duly pay their taxes. For 
example, Ziraat paid out TL906 million ($545 million) in taxes in 2009 (Ziraat 2010, 22). 
Such incoming money, moreover, is fungible. Authorities can use Ziraat‟s returns and 
taxes for any number of politically-determined fiscal activities – from debt repayment to 
the cross subsidization of public infrastructure projects and social service funding (or not, 
of course, and could be used for nefarious purposes without proper democratic 
oversight). According to the IMF the public banks combined, including the Central Bank, 
have directly reduced annual public debt by 0.6, 0.7, 0.7, 1.2, and 1.1 percent from 2006 
to 2010 inclusive (2012, 63). The sustained reduction of public debt bolsters AKP 
legitimacy and supports Turkey‟s international creditworthiness vital to accessing flows 
of capital. It also enlarges the space for political manoeuvre enjoyed by the government. 
For example, the 64th Government formed by the AKP after the November 2015 
elections promised the provision of new incentives for entrepreneurs and the private 
sector, as the lower public debt levels enabled such stimulus measures. Given the 
immense fiscal pressures of neoliberalism, such revenue generation is difficult for any 
government to forgo regardless of its ideological orientation. This constitutes another 
reason why the AKP has not fully privatized the public banks, and points towards the 
banks‟ persisted, yet evolved, class-based credibility. 
 Several factors help account for the banks‟ performance. For one, in an 
unorthodox move the CBRT aggressively cut interest rates at the start of the 2008-09 
crisis. Whereas the official rate was 16.75 percent in October 2008, by October 2009 it 
was 10 percent less, or 6.75 percent. This benefited public and private banks alike as 
they could generate returns from the widening interest rate margins. Contingently, the 
CBRT was able to aggressively cut domestic interest rates because US interest rates 
remained much lower, and hence the risk of capital flight was mitigated (BAT 2010, 1-2; 
BAT 2009). The risk of the unorthodox interest rate cut was partially mitigated by the still 
over 30 percent public control of the banking sector in Turkey. State authorities could be 
assured the public banks would not engage in capital strikes or an investment credit 
rationing backlash. Likewise, Turkey‟s fiscal surplus helped assure foreign capital of 
investing in Turkey. At the same time, the public banks were still able to access foreign 
capital markets given implicit sovereign guarantees. 
Another factor was that Turkish citizens saw the public banks as „safe havens‟ for 
their savings, especially during the crisis. Over the course of 2008-09, deposits grew by 
over 9 percent in Halkbank (2010, 5) and by 17 percent in Ziraat (2010, 14). Turkey‟s 
public sector, too, channels deposits and payments through the public banks. Domestic 
savings thus account for up to three quarters of the public banks‟ deposit base, which 
offer the public banks a stable and cheap source of loanable capital (BAT 2009, 71-4; 
2012, I-6). To further safeguard their growing returns, bank managers, public and 
private, held down increases in operating and staff expenses in 2008-09 (Marois 2012, 
187-8). The result was that banking sector net income exploded by 52 percent to TL19.5 
billion in 2009 (BAT 2010, I-46). 
 In this phase of neoliberalism since the 2008-09 crisis, Turkey‟s public banks 
have assumed new credibilities that are inconsistent with the ideology of neoliberalism 
but not its volatile practicality. On the one hand, the public banks provide neoliberal state 
authorities with a powerful counter-cyclical lending tool. Moreover, neoliberal 
restructuring of the banks has meant the public banks remain profit- and revenue-
generating. This helps support neoliberal economic continuity, to the benefit of capital in 
Turkey. On the other hand, farmers and SMEs (and by extension, workers via continued 
jobs) benefit from the provisioning of subsidized credits. That said, neither the public 
banks‟ credits nor anything else the ruling AKP government has done since 2002 has 
improved Turkey‟s structurally abysmal position, alongside Mexico and Chile, at the very 
bottom of OECD inequality rankings (OECD 2014, 111). 
 
5.0  Conclusion: Public Banking Credibility and Class in and beyond 
Neoliberalism? 
 
Contrary to conventional pre-social understandings, there is nothing straightforward 
about the operations, functions, and historical changes in public banks. Indeed, even 
under neoliberal capitalism public banks can acquire levels of credibility that enable 
them to persist – against all neoliberal ideological odds. As Ho argues “If certain 
institutions have emerged, and more importantly, persist as a result of spontaneous, 
endogenous development, they are likely to fulfill a certain function, and apparently are 
perceived as credible.” (2013, 1095) Our historical materialist approach locates such 
credibility within the confines of capitalism. We have emphasized the institutions‟ social 
content and demonstrated how credibility is evolving and contradictory in class terms. 
We find, then, that ownership is not determining in itself, but subject to changing 
historical-structural and social forces. In the case of Turkey‟s public banks, the balance 
of influence has been on the side of capitalist relations. Workers, small producers, and 
peasant farmers have benefited through enhanced financial access and supportive 
credits channelled through the public banks. Yet in doing so the public banks have 
helped to produce, stabilize, and reproduce otherwise exploitative capital–labour 
relations in Turkey, if not without unintended consequences.  
Our study thus points to the historical specificity of Turkey‟s public banks 
underwriting capitalist continuity. But this historical role is not inevitably so. Given a 
different constellation of class forces, public banks could have taken a different turn in 
history and might yet still underwrite a break in neoliberalism. A social content framework 
allows interpretive room for the potentiality of workers, peasants, and popular classes to 
reclaim and reshape vital institutions like public banks in their own collective interests, 
that is, for change. In Turkey, given its existing institutional and material public banking 
capacity, the possibility remains, but only potentially so and if matched by collective 
political will.  
Any strategizing around mobilizing public banking to move beyond neoliberalism 
must be done cautiously, as even the best intentions can have unintended and 
contradictory consequences. For this critical scholars need to excavate actually existing 
and most certainly complex examples of public banking, as in the case of Turkey, and 
how such cases might function to counter-act neoliberal competitive imperatives and 
class rule. Yet it is here that policy alternatives to neoliberalism are on unsure footings. 
Very little research details the institutional functions of existing alternative banks.4 And 
one must not presume public banking, in itself, is any alternative at all. The case of 
Turkey certainly undermines any such over-simplifications. Forms of private banking 
(community, worker collective, cooperative), too, can offer important lessons. Likewise, 
hybrid public and corporatized state-owned forms can mitigate otherwise intense 
neoliberal competitive and profit imperatives in social developmental ways. Still, all these 
forms of banking may not – it all depends on the specific and evolving social content 
defining particular banking institutions‟ and their wider systems of social reproduction.  
                                                 
4
 For some examples of public banking, see Butzbach and von Mettenheim 2014). Intriguing 
specific examples include the Banco Popular in Costa Rica (see www.bancopopular.fi.cr) and the 
Bank for Social Policy in Vietnam (Sikor 2012, 1092-3). 
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değerlendirmeler. BSB Metinleri. http://goo.gl/Ra5JAC (accessed 17 March 2013). 
 
Balassa, B. 1982, Structural Adjustment Policies in Developing Economies. World 
Development, 10, 1: 23-38. 
 
Barth, J. R., G. Caprio Jr. and R. Levine. 2006. Rethinking bank regulation: till angels 
govern. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
BAT (Banks Association of Turkey). 1999. In its 40th year: the Banks Association of 
Turkey and the Turkish banking system, 1958–97. Istanbul: BAT. 
 
––––– 2009. 50th anniversary of The Banks Association of Turkey and banking system 
‘1958-2007’. Istanbul: BAT. 
 
––––– 1971-2010. Banks in Turkey. Istanbul: BAT 
 
––––– 2015a. The Banking System in Turkey: Yearly Statistics 1959-2014, BAT, July 
2015. https://goo.gl/XuSvH2, (accessed December 18, 2015). 
 
––––– 2015b. Türkiye’de Bankacılık Sistemi Seçilmiş Rasyolar 2004-2014, BAT, June 
2015. http://goo.gl/RxW7O3, (accessed December 10, 2015). 
 
Berberoglu, B. 1980. State Capitalism and National Industrialization in Turkey. 
Development and Change, 11: 97-121. 
 
Bertay, A.C., A. Demirgüç-Kunt, and H. Huizinga. 2015. Bank ownership and credit over 
the business cycle: Is lending by state banks less procyclical? Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 50: 326-39. 
 
Brei, M. and A. Schclarek. 2013. Public bank lending in times of crisis. Journal of 
Financial Stability 9: 820–30. 
 
Brenner N., J. Peck and N. Theodore. 2010. Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, 
modalities, pathways. Global Network 10: 182-222. 
 
BRSA (Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency). 2002. Banking sector reform: 
progress report. July, Ankara: BRSA. 
 
––––– 2003. Banking sector restructuring program progress report – (VII). October, 
Ankara: BRSA. 
 
––––– 2015. Türk bankacılık sektörü temel göstergeler, September 2015, Ankara: BDDK 
 
Butzbach, O. and K. von Mettenheim, eds. 2014. Alternative banking and financial crisis. 
London: Pickering & Chatto. 
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Radice, H. 2004. Comparing National Capitalisms. In Where are national capitalisms 
now? Ed. Perraton J. and B. Clift, 183-93. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Savran, S. 2002. The Legacy of the Twentieth Century, in The Politics of Permanent 
Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey, ed. N. Balkan and S. Savran, Huappauge, 
NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 
 
Shleifer, A. 1998. State versus private ownership. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, 
no 4: 133-50. 
 
Sikor T. 2012. Tree plantations, politics of possession and the absence of landgrabs in 
Vietnam. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 39: 3-4, 1077-1101. 
Solomon, M.S. 2010.Critical Ideas in Times of Crisis: Reconsidering Smith, Marx, 
Keynes, and Hayek. Globalizations 7, no.1-2: 127–35. 
 
Spratt, S. 2009. Development Finance: Debates, dogmas, and new directions, London: 
Routledge. 
 
UN. 2015. Report of the third International Conference on Financing for Development, 
Addis Ababa 13-16 July 2015. 
 
Vanberg, V. J. 2005. Market and state: The perspective of constitutional political 
economy. Journal of Institutional Economics 1, no 1: 23-49. 
 
World Bank. 2000. Turkey country economic memorandum, structural reforms for 
sustainable growth, Report No. 20657-TU. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
 
–––––2001. Finance for growth: Policy choices in a volatile world. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
 
–––––2012. Global financial development report 2013: Rethinking the role of state in 
finance. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
–––––2012b. Survey of national development banks. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Yalman, G. 2009. Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s, Istanbul 
Bilgi University Press. 
 
Yeldan, E. 2006. Neoliberal Global Remedies: From Speculative-Led Growth to IMF-led 
Crisis in Turkey. Review of Radical Political Economics 38, no 2: 193-213. 
 
Yüzgün, A. 1982.Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türk Banka Sistemi (1923-1981). Istanbul: Der. 
 
Ziraat Bank. 2010. 2009 Annual Report. Ankara: Ziraat Bank. 
 
–––––2011. 2010 Annual Report. Ankara: Ziraat Bank. 
 
 
